Updated on 2023/02/05

写真a

 
TAKAMIYA Koji
 
Organization
Academic Assembly Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences KEIZAIGAKU KEIRETU Associate Professor
Faculty of Economic Sciences Department of Interdisciplinary Economic Studies Associate Professor
Title
Associate Professor
External link

Degree

  • 博士(経済学) ( 2001.3   北海道大学 )

Research Areas

  • Humanities & Social Sciences / Economic theory  / Microeconomics, Game theory, Mechanism design, Social choice

Research History (researchmap)

  • Niigata University   Faculty of Economic Sciences   Associate Professor

    2020.4

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  • Niigata University   Graduate School of Modern Society and Culture Multisocial Studies   Associate Professor

    2012.4

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  • Niigata University   Faculty of Economics Department of Economics   Associate Professor

    2007.4 - 2020.3

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  • Osaka University   The Institute of Social and Economic Research   Lecturer

    2003.4 - 2007.3

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  • Hokkaido University   Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration   Research Assistant

    2001.4 - 2003.3

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Research History

  • Niigata University   Faculty of Economic Sciences Department of Interdisciplinary Economic Studies   Associate Professor

    2020.4

  • Niigata University   Graduate School of Modern Society and Culture Economics and Management   Associate Professor

    2012.4 - 2020.3

  • Niigata University   Graduate School of Modern Society and Culture Multisocial Studies   Associate Professor

    2012.4 - 2020.3

  • Niigata University   Faculty of Economics Department of Economics   Associate Professor

    2007.4 - 2020.3

Education

  • Hokkaido University   Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration

    - 2001.3

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    Country: Japan

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Papers

  • On the infinity of money: a remembrance of Tetsuya Kasahara

    Takamiya, Koji

    ( 111 )   77 - 85   2021.9

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    Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • On a proof of the existence of stable matchings using a fixed point theorem

    Takamiya, Koji

    ( 110 )   91 - 98   2021.3

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • Recognition and coalition formation

    Takamiya, Koji, Yamaguchi, Chikara

    Economic Studies   69 ( 2 )   51 - 63   2020.1

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • On a Non-Constructive Proof of the Existence of Stable Matchings

    106   87 - 91   2019.3

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • On Weak Maskin Monotonicity in One-to-Many Matching with Contracts

    104   143 - 148   2018.3

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

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  • Matching Theory and Its Background

    Takamiya Koji

    102 ( 102 )   63 - 78   2017.3

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)  

    CiNii Article

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  • Computational complexity in the design of voting rules Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya, Akira Tanaka

    THEORY AND DECISION   80 ( 1 )   33 - 41   2016.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER  

    This paper considers the computational complexity of the design of voting rules, which is formulated by simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.

    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9422-7

    Web of Science

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  • Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   42 ( 1 )   115 - 130   2013.2

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:SPRINGER HEIDELBERG  

    This paper examines coalition formation problems from the viewpoint of mechanism design. We consider the case where (i) the list of feasible coalitions (those coalitions which are permitted to form) is given in advance; and (ii) each individual's preference is a ranking over those feasible coalitions which include this individual. We are interested in requiring the mechanism to guarantee each coalition the "right" of forming that coalition at least when every member of the coalition ranks the coalition at the top. We name this property coalitional unanimity. We examine the compatibility between coalitional unanimity and incentive requirements, and prove that if the mechanism is strategy-proof and respects coalitional unanimity, then for each preference profile, there exists at most one strictly core stable partition, and the mechanism chooses such a partition whenever available. Further, the mechanism is coalition strategy-proof and respects coalitional unanimity if, and only if, the strictly core stable partition uniquely exists for every preference profile.

    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0318-x

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  • Complexity consideration on the existence of strategy-proof social choice functions Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2010)   2010.9

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  • Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS   45 ( 1-2 )   199 - 204   2009.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

    This note considers the equilibrium Outcomes of the preference revelation games in the general model of indivisible good allocation introduced by [Sonmez, T., 1999. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica 67, 677-689]. We adopt the concepts of coalitional equilibria and cores which are both defined in terms of the weak deviation or blocking by a prescribed class of admissible coalitions, We prove that if the solution which induces preference revelation games is individually rational and pareto optimal and the class of admissible coalitions is "monotonic," then the set of coalitional equilibrium outcomes coincides with the core. And we point out that the preceding analysis in the context of marriage problems [Gale, D., Shapley, L, 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9-15] is hardly extended to the general model. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.08.007

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  • Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    ECONOMICS LETTERS   95 ( 3 )   348 - 354   2007.6

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

    It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller, E., and Satterthwaite, M., (1977). The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness. J. Econ. Theory, 14 pp412-18.). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.005

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  • Domains of Social Choice Functions on which Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Maskin Monotonicity are Equivalent Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC-2006)   2006.12

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  • On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem. Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    Economics Bulletin   3 ( 19 )   1 - 8   2006.8

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  • The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium Reviewed

    T Shinotsuka, K Takamiya

    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR   44 ( 2 )   379 - 389   2003.8

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

    In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the winning coalitions, can exercise their power. We show that the weak core correspondence is the minimal correspondence satisfying Maskin Monotonicity and Strong Non-Discrimination. We also show that the weak core is the unique correspondence satisfying Nash implementability, Strong Non-Discrimination, and Exclusion. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00055-1

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  • On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result Reviewed

    Koji Takamiya

    Social Choice and Welfare   20 ( 1 )   77 - 83   2003.2

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    In a general model of indivisible good allocation, Sönmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of 'richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory.

    DOI: 10.1007/s003550200169

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  • The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the alpha-core Reviewed

    K Takamiya

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY   30 ( 2 )   195 - 207   2001.12

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:PHYSICA-VERLAG GMBH & CO  

    This paper examines the alpha-core of strategic games by means of the consistency principle. I provide a new definition of a reduced game for strategic games. And I define consistency (CONS) and two forms of converse consistency (COLONS and COCONS*) under this definition of reduced games. Then I axiomatize the alpha-core for families of strategic games with bounded payoff functions by the axioms CONS, COCONS*, weak Pareto optimality (WPO) and one person rationality (OPR). Furthermore, I show that these four axioms are logically independent. In proving this, I also axiomatize the alpha-individually rational solution by CONS, COLONS and OPR for the same families of games. Here the alpha-individually rational solution is a natural extension of the classical 'maximin' solution.

    DOI: 10.1007/s001820100074

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  • Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets Reviewed

    K Takamiya

    MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES   41 ( 2 )   201 - 213   2001.3

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV  

    This paper studies (single-valued) solutions to housing markets [Shapley and Scarf, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1 (1974) 23] with strict preferences. I show that a solution is monotonic if and only if it is coalition strategy-proof. I point out that the strong core solution is the only solution which is monotonic, individually rational and an onto function. (As Roth and Postlewaite [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 4 (1977) 131] showed, the strong core solution is single-valued when the preferences are strict.) This result follows from the above equivalence theorem and a preceding characterization of the strong core solution by Ma [International Journal of Game Theory, 23 (1994) 75]. My characterization sharpens Sonmez's [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 26 (1996) 429] similar result by weakening Pareto optimality to ontoness. I also provide some related results. A solution is strategy-proof and nonbossy if and only if it is monotonic. Thus the strong core solution is the unique solution which is strategy-proof, nonbossy, individually rational, and onto. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

    DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00062-7

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  • A Basic Lemma on Social Welfare Functions: Derivation of Arrow's and Sen's Theorems

    Koji Takamiya

    Economic Journal of Hokkaido University   29   121 - 127   2000.7

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (bulletin of university, research institution)   Publisher:Hokkaido University  

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Books

  • こんなに使える経済学―肥満から出世まで(ちくま新書)

    大竹文雄その他( Role: Joint editor ,  第1章3節 臓器売買なしに移植を増やす方法)

    筑摩書房  2008.1 

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    Language:Japanese Book type:General book, introductory book for general audience

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MISC

  • 臓器売買なしに移植を増やす方法

    高宮 浩司

    週刊エコノミスト   84 ( 64 )   112 - 113   2006.12

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    Language:Japanese   Publishing type:Article, review, commentary, editorial, etc. (trade magazine, newspaper, online media)   Publisher:毎日新聞社  

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Research Projects

  • マッチング理論の価格理論的基礎

    Grant number:20K01559  2020.4 - 2025.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業 基盤研究(C)  基盤研究(C)

    高宮 浩司

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    Grant amount:\1690000 ( Direct Cost: \1300000 、 Indirect Cost:\390000 )

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  • マッチングマーケットデザインの基礎とその拡張

    2014.4 - 2019.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  基盤研究(C)

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    Grant type:Competitive

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  • マッチングマーケットデザインの新展開:非2部マッチングの研究

    2011.4 - 2014.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  若手研究(B)

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    Grant type:Competitive

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  • 近似的メカニズムによるマッチングマーケットデザインの新手法

    2009.4 - 2011.3

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  若手研究(B)

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    Grant type:Competitive

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Teaching Experience

  • 演習I

    2022
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習II

    2022
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • スタディスキルズII

    2022
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済学入門

    2022
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • スタディスキルズIII

    2022
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済数学II

    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論演習

    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論研究

    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論特論

    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済数学Ⅰ

    2020
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • スタディスキルズⅠ

    2020
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • スタディスキルズⅡ

    2020
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済経営総合演習

    2019
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論

    2017
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅡA(高宮浩司)

    2015
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 卒業論文(高宮浩司)

    2015
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅡB(高宮浩司)

    2015
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅠA(高宮浩司)

    2014
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅠB(高宮浩司)

    2014
    -
    2015
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論への招待

    2013
    -
    2017
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 卒業論文

    2011
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • スタディスキルズ(経済学科)

    2010
    -
    2018
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅡB

    2009
    -
    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅡA

    2009
    -
    2021
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済数学

    2008
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅠB

    2008
    -
    2020
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 演習ⅠA

    2008
    -
    2020
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論特論

    2008
    -
    2018
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論演習

    2008
    -
    2018
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 課題研究Ⅲ

    2008
    -
    2017
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • ゲーム理論研究

    2008
    -
    2017
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 数理経済学(ゲーム理論)

    2008
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 課題研究Ⅰ

    2008
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 課題研究Ⅱ

    2008
    -
    2016
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 特定研究Ⅲ

    2008
    -
    2014
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 特定研究Ⅰ

    2008
    -
    2014
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 特定研究Ⅱ

    2008
    -
    2014
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済数学(線形代数)

    2007
    -
    2010
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 社会経済数理特論

    2007
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 経済数学(微積分)

    2007
    Institution name:新潟大学

  • 社会経済数理演習

    2007
    Institution name:新潟大学

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