Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

Building on the work of Ostrovsky (2008) on supply chain networks, Fleiner et al. (2016) showed that, in possibly cyclic trading networks under fully substitutable preferences, the set of fully trail-stable matchings is nonempty by characterizing it using the set of the fixed points of an increasing function. I characterize the fully trail-stable matchings using a different fixed point (increasing) function, rendering generalized T-algorithm for such environments. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.032

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE  

in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the set of equilibrium outcomes in a search model reduces to the set of stable matchings in a corresponding Gale-Shapley marriage problem. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

DOI： 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1

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Language：English   Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher：ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA  

The set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley marriage problem is characterized as the fixed points of an increasing function. Its well-known non-emptiness and lattice property are an immediate consequence of Tarski's fixed point theorem. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71.

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